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"WILL SADDAM HUSSEIN GET A FAIR TRIAL?"
Debate between Dr. Curtis F. J. Doebbler
and Professor Michael P. Scharf
Moderator:
Hiram E. Chodosh, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs,
School of Law, Case Western Reserve University
Participants:
Professor Dr. Curtis F.J. Doebbler, international human rights lawyer, Pro-
fessor of Law at An-Najah National University in Nablus, Palestine, and
member of legal team representing Saddam Hussein, and
Professor Michael P. Scharf, Professor of Law and Director of the Frederick
K. Cox International Law Center, Case School of Law
ASSOCIATE DEAN HIRAM CHODOSH:
I'm Hiram Chodosh, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs for the
School of Law at Case Western Reserve University. On behalf of the Fre-
derick K. Cox International Law Center and the War Crimes Research of-
fice, welcome.
The Cox Center is dedicated to advancing understanding and solutions
to the most critical issues of global justice. The Center supports innovative,
educational programs, including a concentration of thirty-five courses, ex-
periential and service learning, and our clinics, labs, and externships and
study-abroad programs, cutting-edge research through symposia on terror-
ism, the Middle East, intellectual property, nation-building, and many other
issues, and service to the broader community.
Today's debate, "The Hussein Trial on Trial," kicks off the Cox Cen-
ter's newest program, the International Debate Series, which will feature an
annual debate between leading experts on an important and timely issue of
international law.
* Sponsored by the Case Western Reserve University Frederick K. Cox International Law
Center on Thursday, January 13, 2005. The debate was broadcast nationally on C-SPAN on
January 29, 2005: <http://www.C-span store.org/shop/index.php?mainpage=product_
video info&cPath=18_19&products-id+184702-1>.
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Before we begin, a few points of background. As you know, on De-
cember 10, 2003, the Iraqi Governing Council approved a statute establish-
ing the Iraqi Special Tribunal for crimes against humanity, and Paul
Bremer, the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, signed the statute
into law.
The tribunal is charged with the responsibility to prosecute those ac-
cused of crimes of aggression, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and
genocide in Iraq between July 17, 1968, when Iraqi President Saddam Hus-
sein's Ba'ath Party seized power, and May 1st, 2003, when President Bush
declared the conclusion of major combat operations in Iraq. U.S. forces
captured Saddam Hussein only four days after the establishment of the tri-
bunal on December 14th, 2003.
On July 1, 2004, Saddam Hussein was arraigned before an investigat-
ing judge and informed of the allegations, including: the systematic killing
of religious figures in 1974; two, killing off the Kurdish Barzani clan in
1983; three, torturing and killing members of political parties over the last
thirty years; four, using chemical weapons against the Kurds in Halabja in
1988; five, the Anfal ethnic cleansing campaign against Kurds between
1987 and 1988; six, the 1990 invasion of Kuwait; and seven, drying rivers,
killing hundreds of thousands of Marsh Arabs in response to their 1991 up-
rising.
The U.S. involvement in the tribunal, the statute, and the selection of
judges, the absence of international jurists, the fear of violence against inex-
perienced Iraqi judges and witnesses, the isolation of Hussein under heavily
guarded detention, the availability of the death penalty, the emerging civil
war, the collective conviction of the former Iraqi regime in the court of pub-
lic opinion, all raise a central question: Can Saddam Hussein get a fair trial
before the Iraqi Special Tribunal?
During the next hour, our own Professor Michael Scharf, Director of
the Cox Center, founder of the War Crimes Research Office and Adviser to
the Iraqi Special Tribunal; and Professor Curtis Doebbler, a leading human
rights expert, one of two Americans, the other being former Attorney Gen-
eral Ramsey Clark, who are defending Saddam Hussein before the Iraqi
Special Tribunal, will debate this issue. Doebbler will argue that Saddam
Hussein cannot get a fair trial before the Tribunal. Scharf will refute this
claim.
These two leading experts do not sit neatly in their respective adversar-
ial positions. When he first learned of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, Scharf
wrote that it will be viewed as a puppet of the occupying power, and Doeb-
bler has spent most of his career representing the interests of people, includ-
ing over two million people in the Sudan, subjected to human rights abuses.
Both are committed human rights experts; both seek justice for the Iraqi
people and the broader international community. Each is here to contribute,
albeit through heated disagreement to our appreciation of these critical is-
sues.
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The debate format today is simple. Each side, beginning with
Professor Doebbler, will have fifteen minutes to make his argument.
Professor Doebbler will then have three minutes to rebut Professor Scharf s
argument, and the remaining time we will take four questions from the au-
dience, two directed at Scharf and two for Doebbler. Each will be allowed
two minutes to answer the question and one minute to comment on the re-
sponse to the other's answer. You have been provided forms to write your
questions down during the debate. If you have a question, please raise your
form in the air, and they will be collected by our student assistants and
brought to me for selection. The same process applies to those of you who
are viewing the debate upstairs from our overflow room. Please supply
your name and write clearly. And now, Professor Doebbler, you have fif-
teen minutes.
PROFESSOR CURTIS DOEBBLER:
Thank you very much. I want to thank Case Western Reserve Univer-
sity for being willing to host such a debate like this. There have been many
other places that have shied away from discussing this issue although I think
it is a very vital issue for human rights and, as I will try to indicate, a very
vital issue for the values that underlie our society here in the United States.
So I want to thank them very much, and to thank particularly Professor
Scharf for being willing to join me in this forum.
The first issue that has to be addressed is the fact that this whole situa-
tion, the trials, what is happening right now in Iraq, the military involve-
ment, the soldiers that are being killed, the civilians that are being killed, the
destruction of Fallujah, all this has taken place in violation of international
law. I have been to more than sixty countries after the invasion of Iraq in
March 2003, and I have not met one lawyer with whom I had to argue about
the illegality of the invasion, except in the United States. In every other
country I visited, and meeting with some of the heads of state of those coun-
tries and some of their most senior lawyers, they were unequivocally con-
vinced that the United States' aggression against Iraq was a violation of
international law, a violation of Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United
Nations, which represents binding international law for the United States.
So we have to look at it from that perspective.
In other words, think about it as if another country came to the United
States, decided it didn't like President Bush and the Republicans in power
because they thought that President Bush was a war criminal for having
committed crimes of aggression against other countries, invaded the United
States, and then put him on trial claiming that they would give him a fair
trial. That is the situation right now that we face in Iraq. And I think it is
important for us not to lose sight of that, the crucial starting point is the ille-
gal use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of
another sovereign country in violation of international law.
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Furthermore, even today, some would say that there is still an ongoing
use of force against the people of Iraq and there is certainly an occupation
of large parts of Iraq. This occupation is an illegal occupation, in part, be-
cause it was based on an illegal use of force, in part, because it is an occupa-
tion by a foreign power that has acted oppressively in the areas that it
occupies.
So the second important aspect to understand is that Iraq, at least large
parts of the country, are in a state of occupation. Legally, that means that
there is law that applies to an occupier and how an occupier can treat the
people of a country, how it can treat the institutions of a country, and in
Iraq, the United States, I suggest, has not abided by this law.
In fact, part of that law, the Fourth Geneva Convention, states that an
occupying power may not dissolve the judicial bodies of a country and insti-
tute its own judicial bodies. The United States has dissolved the judicial
institutions of Iraq, and it has instated its own judges.
Yes, many of these judges were taken from among Iraqi judges, but
only after Iraqi judges were politically vetted to decide which ones should
stay. And they did not vet them for their legal competence; no, they vetted
them in a process they called de-Ba'athification, a process to which every
single one of the judges was subjected because ever single judge in Iraq,
with maybe an insignificant number of exceptions, were members of the
Ba'ath Party.
In fact, the most senior judges in Iraq were senior members of the
Ba'ath Party. These judges were excluded from the judiciary. It is not a
huge number, 180 of maybe 900 judges, but they are the most senior judges.
The judges that are left are some of the most junior judges. Some of them
were not even judges before, and now they have been made, by essentially
decree, judges. These are the individuals who will be part of the court.
Now, I'd like to go through each judge's background and say this is the
judge who is going to be in the court, and these are his qualifications or lack
of qualifications. But I cannot do that. I cannot do that because I don't
know who the judges are of that court. I know one person who is an inves-
tigating judge only because a television tape of the initial appearance in July
leaked out, but that should not have even been made public according to the
American authorities, and that person is a very junior judge, not a very sen-
iorjudge.
So we have a situation where the occupying power has created a tribu-
nal of, in our opinion, less than competent judges that will be trying one of
the most complex and possibly one of the most important cases in recent
history. Certainly, I think that is inappropriate, but more importantly, I
think that is a breach of international law guarantees of a fair, competent,
independent, and impartial tribunal.
The court is not independent because it is created by an occupying
power through a process by which the judges are chosen based not on their
legal qualifications but on a political vetting. The court is not impartial
prima facie in the words of the State Department, commenting on South
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American countries, because faceless judges are prima facie, an illegitimate
form of judiciary. And they violate the provisions of due process in a vari-
ety of ways.
If there is to be a court in Iraq that tries individuals for international
crimes, such a court must have the authority to try every individual who has
committed a crime against international law in Iraq. That includes crimes of
aggression, which are not included in the statute right now, despite what
you heard about some of the allegations -- and I will come to that in a sec-
ond -- that includes being able to try the nationals of other countries that
may have committed these crimes.
Probably not many of you are old enough to remember, but one of the
greatest criticisms leveled at the Nuremberg and Tokyo processes after
World War II by one of the judges who participated in that process, Judge
Rollings, a Dutch judge of the Tokyo tribunal, was that that process was not
legitimate because it was only "victor's justice" and in his words, that is,
"not justice at all."
If we are going to have a system of the rule of law applied to Iraq if the
occupying power and, hopefully, eventually, a sovereign Iraqi Government
that represents the people of Iraq is going to deal with issues in their country
that require a judiciary to deal with them, we need to have a fair judiciary
established in that country. We do not have that right now.
I want to go through some of the due process rights that are being vio-
lated and that need to be respected in this instance. I mentioned some of
them already, and because many of you are law students, I will point out,
although not with the jurisprudence, we don't have time for that here, at
least some of the provisions of international law, which are relevant.
For example, many of you know that Article 14 of the International
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights provides for a competent, independ-
ent, and impartial tribunal. This right is also provided for in the American
Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, which although not a binding
treaty on the United States, has been accepted many times by the Inter-
American Commission as reflecting customary international law that the
United States must abide by, and those of you who studied constitutional
law are certainly aware that the United States courts have said that custom-
ary international law is part of United States law.
Also, the Geneva Conventions, Article 84, subparagraph 2 of the Third
Geneva Convention specifically, contains the right to be judged by an inde-
pendent and impartial tribunal.
One also has a right to be informed of the charges against him in a
timely manner. That is in both the Third Geneva Convention, Article 104,
and the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights article 14, sub-
paragraph 3(a). The right to be informed of charges against you is not the
right to stand before somebody who points at you and says "We think you
have done many bad things," or to even come before one who rails against
you based on his perception of what might be public values.
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It is the right to come before a court where you are presented with a
prima facie case of facts against you and where you are able to reply to
those facts, and most importantly, it is a chance to understand what provi-
sions of law you have violated.
I don't know if any of you have seen -- I have watched it numerous
times as you can imagine -- the process which took place apparently in
Baghdad at the beginning of July 2004. Not one provision of law was men-
tioned in relation to any charges. In fact, at one point, the judge held up the
law, and said that this is the basis of the establishment of the tribunal and
the President replied that he was holding up the criminal law that was
signed into law by the President.
The judge didn't even have the sense to open the book he was holding,
and look at that criminal law and cite some of its provisions. That in my
view -- and I think the view of any criminal lawyer -- is a travesty of justice.
If you are brought before a criminal tribunal in this country, I hope that they
will cite a provision of law that you have violated in any indictment or
allegations against you.
I will not go through all of the due process rights. There are more than
20 rights that have been violated, but because of time, I just want to point
out one or two important ones, particularly one that is important to myself
as one of the counsel for the individual concerned, and that is the right to be
able to have contact with a lawyer and not just any lawyer, not like in Guan-
tanamo, where the state decides who your lawyers are.
I represent some individuals in Guantanamo Bay as well, and do you
know what the Government told me? If I wanted to see those individuals, I
have to sign an agreement stating that I would essentially tell the Govern-
ment anything that was mentioned in my communications between them.
That is an inappropriate manner for the government to respect somebody's
right to legal counsel.
This right requires a defendant be able to consult with legal counsel of
his own choosing and to be able to consult in confidence, and to be able to
facilitate a defense.
Seeing that the time is running out, let me just end here because as you
can see, it takes quite a long time just to get through the basic principles
being violated in this case -- but let me just conclude by mentioning that it is
not only Iraqis from whom we are setting a bad example by disrespecting or
ignoring the rule of law, but it is a important to all of you in this room, or at
least those of you who are lawyers, because the law is based on respect for
the law and respect for the rule of law for everybody equally. Thank you.
ASSOCIATE DEAN CHODOSH:
Thank you, Professor Doebbler.
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PROFESSOR MICHAEL SCHARF:
Let me begin by thanking Mr. Curtis Doebbler for coming to Cleveland
this morning, braving the winds of the Chicago Airport to make it here for
this nationally televised debate. We actually met on line. After I had writ-
ten a piece entitled "Can this Man Get a Fair Trial," which appeared in the
Washington Post Outlook Section a few weeks ago, there was a Washington
Post online discussion, in which Mr. Doebbler wrote, "Dear Michael: I
have followed your online chat with interest, even encouraging some of my
volunteers to participate. Rather than debate your many wrong or mislead-
ing statements on line, I would like to invite you to debate me in person.
Maybe the Washing Post would sponsor such a debate or maybe even your
law school. As you undoubtedly are aware, I am one of the lawyers for Mr.
Saddam Hussein, and I am intimately familiar with the proceedings in the
case. Best regards, Curtis Doebbler."
I wrote back "Dear Curtis: I would enjoy very much a public debate
with you. Would you have any interest in coming to Case Western Reserve
University for such an event?" And here we are now.
The other thing I want to do is provide a disclaimer. Although I was
one of five experts from around the world selected by the Department of
Justice Regime Crimes Liaison Office in Baghdad to help train the IST
judges, I must stress I do not speak for the Iraqi Special Tribunal or the De-
partment of Justice, and I have not received any financial compensation for
my assistance. I am assisting the IST because I feel very strongly that this
will be one of the most important trials of our lifetime, and I want to make
sure that this trial complies fully with international human rights standards.
Now, let me begin by responding to Mr. Doebbler's attempt to link the
issue of the validity of the invasion in 2003 with the question of the legiti-
macy of the Iraqi Special Tribunal process.
First of all, the Security Council of the United Nations, representing all
the countries in the world, recognized in Resolution 1546 that the occupa-
tion ended and the Iraqi Interim Government was sovereign as of June 30,
2004. It has recognized the legitimacy of the Iraqi Interim Government, as
well as the process for democratic elections to be held at the end of this
month. Further, in calling for accountability for violations of international
humanitarian law, the Security Council made a distinction between what
many countries feel was an unauthorized invasion and the issue of what to
do next.
Secondly, if the democratically elected Government of Iraq approves
the statute and the judges of this tribunal, there would be no issue of a viola-
tion of the Geneva Conventions because that would severe any argument
that this was a statute and a court that was set up solely by an occupying
Government. The new Iraqi Government could do this indirectly by ap-
proving the funding for the IST and continuing its operations, including the
construction of its facilities, the issuance of indictments, the conduct of in-
vestigations, and the commencement of trials.
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And third, Mr. Doebbler's argument smacks of what is known in inter-
national law as the tu quo que defense. This is Latin for "you also." And it
is a defense that the Nuremberg defendants raised sixty years ago; it is a
defense Milosevic has raised at his trial before the Yugoslavia Tribunal in
The Hague, and it is almost always raised by former leaders accused of war
crimes. International courts have always dismissed this defense as invalid.
In doing so, they say it is true that in wars and in foreign affairs many
countries violate international law, but when a tribunal is set up to prosecute
defendants, the only question is: were these defendants guilty of the crimes
charged? And the fact that opposing leaders may have also violated interna-
tional law or committed war crimes does not excuse the guilt of these de-
fendants. Therefore, the tu quo que defense is not a valid defense. It may
resonate as a television sound bite, but legally, it doesn't hold water.
Now, with respect to judging the legitimacy of the Iraqi Special Tribu-
nal, there is international precedent that gives us a guide for making this
determination and that comes out of the Yugoslavia Tribunal set up by the
UN Security Council in 1993. In its first judgment, known as the Tadic
case, the Tribunal ruled on whether it was validly established and what it
means to be a legitimate tribunal. The Yugoslavia Tribunal focused on
three criteria:
First of all, international law requires that a war crimes tribunal be es-
tablished by a statute, not just executive fiat. There has to be some control-
ling document. Well, the Iraqi Special Tribunal does have a statute. It is
interesting to most people who have read that statute that it looks an awful
lot like the statute of the Yugoslavia Tribunal and the Rwanda Tribunal.
Secondly, the Yugoslavia Tribunal said that to be legitimate a war
crimes tribunal has to be independent from the executive and legislative
branches. Now, according to the Iraqi Special Tribunal, it is independent.
The judges are specifically prohibited from taking direction from the Iraqi
Government or US Government. The president and the legislature of Iraq
cannot control the Iraqi Special Tribunal much like our legislature and
president can't control our own courts.
For evidence that the IST is independent in fact as well as on paper, I
point out that Provisional Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, who is running for
election, has been saying on the campaign trail that the trial of Saddam Hus-
sein and Chemical Ali must start imminently. And there is quite a bit of
pressure from him and others who would like to see these trials commence
as soon as possible. But the Iraqi Special Tribunal said "no, the trials can-
not start because we do not yet have our rules of procedure; the defense
counsel has not had time to prepare their case; and we will not and shall not
be bullied by the executive branch because we are independent," proving, in
fact, that the IST meets the second criterion.
And third, the Yugoslavia Tribunal said that war crimes tribunals have
to comply with fundamental norms of due process, which are enumerated
in the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as Mr. Doebbler mentioned.
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Next, Mr. Doebbler attacked the fairness of the Iraqi Special Tribunal
process, and I believe in assessing the fairness of any tribunal we have to
ask three questions: First, are there fair procedures? Second, are there im-
partial judges? And third, is there equality of arms between the defense
counsel and the prosecution?
With respect to the first of these factors, fair procedures, those are set
out in Article 20 of the Iraqi Special Tribunal statute, which is modeled on
the Yugoslavia Tribunal statute and the Rwanda Tribunal statute. The due
process protections include the presumption of innocence; the right to be
informed promptly and in detail of the charges and to have adequate time
and facilities to prepare a defense and to communicate freely with counsel
of choice; the right to be tried without undue delay; the right to be present
during trial and to appointment of counsel; the right to have counsel present
during questioning; the right to examine and confront witnesses; the right
against self-incrimination and not to have silence taken into account in de-
termining guilt; and the right to disclosure by the Prosecution of exculpatory
evidence, and witness statements; and the right to appeal. These rights will
be further elaborated upon in the rules of procedure of the Iraqi Special Tri-
bunal, which should be coming out after the elections and very soon.
There has been a lot written in the press criticizing the Iraqi Special
Tribunal, saying things like it will allow torture evidence to come in. In
fact, that is the kind of thing that will be specifically addressed in the rules
of procedure, and it is premature to try to allege that that such evidence will
be allowed now when we have not yet seen the rules of procedure publicly.
Those who have been working behind the scenes on the rules of procedure
have suggested that they will be very similar to the rules of the Yugoslavia
and Rwanda Tribunals and will be fully in compliance with Article 14 of the
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights.'
Next, with respect to impartial judges, Mr. Doebbler stressed that their
identities have been kept secret. He mentioned that the only judge the
world has seen is the one young judge, thirty-five year old Judge Ra'id, who
presided over Saddam Hussein's televised hearing last July, and Mr. Doeb-
bler alleged that Judge Ra'id's face was only shown because the footage
leaked out.
Judge Ra'id is one of the judges I got to know best in London because
he spoke fluent English. Judge Ra'id told me the story of how his image
was released to the world during the July 1 st hearing. He told me that he
was given the option of having his face electronically blocked out and his
voice distorted, but he and his colleagues were so committed to the percep-
tion of fairness, that they didn't want the IST to be seen as the kind of
1 As this issue was going to press, the Rules of Procedure of the IST were issued. Rule
79 contains an exclusionary rule, requiring that the written judgments of the IST not refer to
evidence deemed involuntary or obtained by means that cast substantial doubt on its reliabil-
ity. See <http://law.cwru.edu/war-crimes-research-portal/instantanalysis.aspid+15>.
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hooded judges used in Chile and in Peru in the past that have been so criti-
cized by human rights organizations.
So Judge Ra'id said he was willing to take the risk to his security to
have his face shown to the world, and that the other judges throughout the
trial will do the same, notwithstanding the fact that there are threats against
them because they want to show the world how committed they are to fair-
ness.
Now, let me say a few words about who the judges are and who they
are not. One of the things the US public is not generally aware of is that
Iraq was a very litigious society. There are actually 20,000 members of the
Iraqi bar, 10,000 of which reside in Baghdad itself. Out of nine hundred
available judges, about 150 were disqualified because they were active
Ba'athists party members or associated with Saddam Hussein's corrupt na-
tional security courts. That left 750 judges with experience in non-political
murder cases, assault cases, rape cases, and cases involving torts, and con-
tracts, family law, and property matters.
The judges who were selected range in age from thirty-five for Judge
Ra'id, who despite his youth is extremely competent; all the way up to the
mid-sixties. And most have between fifteen and twenty years experience on
the bench.
Now, in London, we spent a lot of time going over the specific crimes
of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggres-
sion because these are crimes that no national judges have experience with.
Even the distinguished jurists selected by the UN to serve on the Yugoslav-
ia Tribunal and the Rwanda Tribunal needed to attend training sessions to
learn this unique area of the law.
And I learned through these training sessions and simulations that the
IST judges really grasped the nuances of this area of law. I also learned that
they were very committed to the possibility of acquittal. They were very
interested to learn that the Nuremberg Tribunal had acquitted three of the
twenty-two major Nazi defendants tried after World War II, and several of
the IST judges said "if the prosecution doesn't prove its case, we will acquit
because we think that will prove to the world how fair this tribunal is."
There is actually an advantage to having Iraqi judges as opposed to in-
ternational judges preside in this case. There is a myth of Nuremberg and
the other international tribunals that the target population will think interna-
tional judges are more fair and an international tribunal's judgment more
credible. In fact, the U.S. Government conducted opinion polls in Germany
after Nuremberg that showed that most of the German an people, 85 to 90
percent of them, thought that the Nuremberg trials were not legitimate, that
the judges were not fair, and that the Nazi defendants, Goering et al., were
not guilty.
One might be tempted to dismiss these numbers because Nuremberg
represented a kind of victor's justice, since the judges were from the four
allied nations: the U.S., the U.K., Russia, and France. What about the mod-
em international war crimes tribunals? Well, the Yugoslavia Tribunal has
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experienced the same thing. During the trial of Slobodan Milsosevic, the
Serb people have been polled, and they say overwhelmingly that Milosevic
is not getting a fair trial, that these international judges are not fair, and they
don't believe that Milosevic is guilty.
Now, if you ask the German people today if they believe in Nuremberg
and the guilt of the Nazi leaders, they say, "yes," and there is some empiri-
cal data that suggests that these views changed in the 1960s at a point when
the German people started having their own trials of the Nazis who had not
been prosecuted at Nuremberg.
And this strongly suggests that Iraqi trials by Iraqi judges are most
likely to convince the Iraqi people of the crimes of the Ba'athist regime --
provided they are proven by credible evidence in an open and fair trial.
Another advantage of domestic trials is that they enable defendants to
effectively subpoena witnesses, whereas Milosevic has not been able to
compel witnesses to testify at his trial since the international tribunal lacks
any type of constabulary.
Finally, let me turn to the question of equality of arms. The fact that
distinguished lawyers like Mr. Doebbler and Ramsey Clark are on the de-
fense team suggests that Saddam Hussein, if anything, has the stronger side
representing him against the Iraqi prosecutors. I have no doubt that every
single procedural issue that possibly can be raised will be raised by this su-
perb defense team which consists of over twenty of the world's most
prominent criminal lawyers.
Defense counsel will raise these issues in front of the five trial judges.
They will raise them again in front of the nine appeals chamber judges, and
Saddam Hussein will get his fair day in court. At the end of the day, if there
is a mountain of evidence proved against him and a record is created like
the twenty-two volumes appended to the Nuremberg judgment, I think his-
tory will look back and say that Saddam Hussein was fairly tried, although
it was a tough case to try. I mean, obviously, when you are dealing with an
Adolf Hitler, a Slobodan Milosevic, or a Saddam Hussein, these are espe-
cially tough cases to try fairly in the face of world public opinion. But the
IST, I believe, is capable of bending over backwards to maintain fairness,
and the real challenge is going to be for it to convince the rest of the world
that the trial of Saddam Hussein was fair. Thank you.
ASSOCIATE DEAN CHODOSH:
Professor Doebbler, you have three minutes to rebut.
PROFESSOR DOEBBLER:
Thank you very much. There are so many things to reply to I don't
know where to start because I think Mike has a very different understanding
of the facts.
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But I must congratulate you because some of these judges I and my
colleagues have known for decades, and we are not able to evaluate their
competence. After one week, you are able to determine that they will pro-
vide a fair trial. So I congratulate you sincerely on that foresight and ability
to look into their minds.
I must say, though, I would rather have my little sister representing me
if she was able to have access to me, to talk with me, to bring me law books,
to be able to facilitate some sort of defense, then even a lawyer as prestig-
ious as yourself, if they tied you up and shipped you off to Siberia and
didn't give you any contact to me but merely said you are my lawyer,... that
doesn't help. It is not a matter of who represents the individual; it is a matter
of being able to prepare a defense, and the first criteria for that is that you
have access to the individual you represent.
And don't take my word for it that this is an unfair trial situation. Take
the word of a High Commissioner for Human Rights of the United Nations,
the word of the head of the tribunal right now, the chief prosecutor of the
tribunal in The Hague, the word of Amnesty International, they have all said
that.
I find somewhat whimsical this restatement, which constantly resur-
faces from journalists and others, of this tu quo que defense. It only seems
to be the other side that mentions it. Perhaps you want to raise that defense
for us, but it is not something right now that is even being considered by the
defense except to listen to it from the other side.
You may well have access to the judges. You may know who the
judges are, but the point of due process is that -- and the point of equality of
arms, as you pointed out -- is that the defense team and the defendant know
these people and have access to them and have access to the evidence.
It is very possible that there are, as the U.S. has claimed, 35,000 tons of
evidence available. But we have not seen one ounce of that evidence, and I
wish that one of you are sometimes put in a position -- or I should say -- I
wish you never to be put in a position of having to defend an individual
when you have no access to that individual and no access to any of the evi-
dence that is being used to allegedly prosecute--or maybe in this case the
better word is persecute--that individual.
And finally, Michael raises the issue of polls. You know, before the
Iraqi war, a poll that was done I believe by CNN -- but you might correct
me on that -- said that most people in the world in the United States and
outside - believed that American President George W. Bush was a greater
threat to peace and security than Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Maybe
we have the wrong guy in the dock? Thank you.
PROFESSOR SCHARF:
Any questions?
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ASSOCIATE DEAN CHODOSH:
The first question goes to Professor Scharf: You said that you had
changed your opinion after your interactions with the Iraqi judges but before
you viewed this as an illegitimate tribunal.
Not everyone has had the benefit of those interactions, and because
perception is a key factor in determining the fairness of the tribunal, isn't it
accurate to say that most people would view the trial as unfair, and by virtue
of that perception, the tribunal is unfair?
PROFESSOR SCHARF:
I wrote a year ago in the International Bar News, a publication that
went out to the 70,000 members of the International Bar Association, that
because the United States had been involved in the drafting of the IST stat-
ute, because US officials were involved in selecting the IST judges, and
because the Department of Justice would be involved in assisting the tribu-
nal, it would probably appear that the IST was a puppet court, and I was
worried about that. And I argued that there should be international judges
added to the IST in order to help counter that kind of perception.
What changed my mind in London was that I found out a lot of things
that haven't been publicly revealed about the IST, and I tried to share this
information in my Washington Post Outlook piece a couple of weeks ago.
The first on these was that the United States did not dictate the terms of the
statute. In fact, the Iraqis themselves were equal players in the negotiations
of the IST Statute, and there were certain provisions like the inclusion of the
crime of aggression of which the United States was not in favor, that ended
up in the statute because of the Iraqis' insistence.
Second, I found out that the United States did not dictate the inclusion
of the death penalty. It turned out the U.S. negotiators actually warned the
Iraqis that including the death penalty would make it harder for the IST to
garner international support. But the Iraqis pointed out that Iraq has always
had the death penalty, going back to the Code of Hammurabi, history's ear-
liest comprehensive legal text. And citing the precedent of Napoleon, they
were extremely concerned that without the death penalty convicted leaders
may one day return to power, as Saddam Hussein himself had done after
being released from prison in 1968.
Third, I found out that the Department of Justice Regime Crimes Liai-
son Office in Baghdad would be no puppet master. The office is made up
of a half-dozen assistant U.S. attorneys from across the United Sates who
volunteered for temporary assignment to Baghdad. The Director of the Of-
fice told me that he had been given an extraordinary amount of autonomy
from Washington, which had decided to remain at arms length in order to
counter the appearance of under influence over the IST. Moreover the Of-
fice had decided to partner with the internationally respected International
Bar Association and other NGOs, which would take the lead in organizing
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training sessions for the judges and prosecutors. And in contrast to what I
initially understood, the DOJ staff will not themselves be filling the advisor
slots identified in the IST Statute. Rather, those positions will go to inde-
pendent experts from around the world selected with the help of the Interna-
tional Bar Association.
And finally, I've learned that the Iraqi Special Tribunal has held up to
its independence against the prime minister's wishes that the trials proceed
as fast as possible because the judges know that a rush to judgment would
be a mistake. I think when the world-wide public learns of these develop-
ments, they will start to come around in their views about the IST. And
there will be further positive developments, for example, when the rules of
procedure are soon promulgated, and the world can see for itself that the
IST has embraced the highest standards of due process.
ASSOCIATE DEAN CHODOSH
Professor Doebbler, anything to respond?
PROFESSOR DOEBBLER:
Yes. I am glad that Michael has such insight into this. We have con-
tacts with several thousands of people in Iraq, regular contacts with them,
and we don't know many of these things. I have had the opportunity to
meet the gentleman who claims that he drafted not only the Special Tribunal
statute but also what is essentially the constitution of Iraq that went into
force on the 8th of March, 2004. That gentleman is a Chicago lawyer. I
have spent more time in Iraq in the last decade than he has.
But more importantly, I think the point that Michael is making is not
that relevant here. It is not a matter of what he understands about the tribu-
nal. Justice must not only be done; it must be seen to be done, and here it is
seen to be undone.
ASSOCIATE DEAN CHODOSH:
Professor Doebbler, we have a question from the audience. You have
emphasized that Saddam Hussein's individual rights have been repeatedly
violated, particularly his rights to due process. However, can you suggest
any other legitimate means in which Mr. Hussein could have been brought
to stand trial for the crimes which he is accused of perpetuating? If Mr.
Hussein's individual rights are somehow superior to the rights of the mil-
lions of people affected by his actions, how can the Iraqis truly obtain the
justice they deserve?
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PROFESSOR DOEBBLER:
I think it is a very good question about how we bring leaders to justice.
Maybe the best way to answer that, particularly in my position representing
somebody involved in such a matter, is by analogy. There is an individual
that we all know who threatened the life not of just twenty-six million peo-
ple in Iraq but of fifty-two million people, if you include Afghanistan as
well, this person is the President of this country.
What he did, as I said, is almost unanimously understood to be a viola-
tion of international law. I think that individuals who carry out those sort of
actions should be punished, but I think that if we are going to punish Bush
for his crimes of aggression, for his crimes against humanity, for his war
crimes, even arguably in the situation of Afghanistan with his statements
about the Taliban saying first that it is a religious organization and that all
its members should be killed, even for genocide perhaps, I think we should
punish everybody who commits these crimes.
But if we are going to do it in a way that is better than the people who
commit the crimes, we must do it with respect to the rule of law. We must
do it with respect to due process. We must do it before a competent, inde-
pendent, and impartial tribunal, not through some form of political vendetta,
which is taking place right now in Iraq.
PROFESSOR SCHARF:
You know, for my part, I am very much a public advocate of interna-
tional tribunals when they are appropriate, but even the Statute of the Inter-
national Criminal Court suggests that such tribunals should be a method of
last resort and that domestic prosecution has many advantages over interna-
tional prosecution. It is better to assist a domestic system, where possible,
to have a trial than to try to move it into the international plane. And this is
not the first time we have seen trials like this being assisted by internation-
als.
After the fall of the Mengistu Regime in Ethiopia, foreign lawyer
groups assisted with the domestic war crimes trials of the Ethiopian leaders.
And international experts are currently playing an important role in the do-
mestic war crimes trials under way in Rwanda and Bosnia -- serving as
prosecutors, defense counsel, and even judges at the national level. But as
Mr. Doebbler points out, it is critically important to ensure that such domes-
tic trials fully comply with international human rights standards. I think the
IST is doing that.
Let me just very quickly respond to the two things Mr. Doebbler said
at the end of his rebuttal. First, with respect to access to Saddam Hussein,
several of the defense counsel have complained publicly that they haven't
had access to their client. Well, as of December, defense counsel got ac-
cess. The defense counsel met with Saddam Hussein, and my understanding
is that that access will resume as soon as the IST can ensure security.
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Second, with respect to access to evidence, I have to ask you to be pa-
tient with these initial delays. The process envisioned will be the same as
that employed in the Yugoslavia Tribunal, the Rwanda Tribunal, and the
Sierra Leone Tribunal. However, until the process is ready to commence,
which will happen shortly after the rules of procedure are issued, the next
steps cannot be taken. The difference here is that defendants were in cus-
tody before the Tribunal was fully operational, but once the process is in
place, the rules of procedure will give defense the right to the evidence.
There will be a Brady-like rule, requiring the Prosecution to turn over
exculpatory evidence, and the defense will have many months to prepare its
case.
ASSOCIATE DEAN CHODOSH:
I wanted to exercise my power as moderator, and in order to be fair to
Professor Doebbler, give him a minute to respond to that.
PROFESSOR DOEBBLER:
Thank you very much. Well, I hope we will get that opportunity. But
again, Michael, I expect you tell me in the next sentence that you are visit-
ing my client every day because you seem to know much more than I do
about him.
We, as defense counsel, need that opportunity. The one opportunity
that we had -- actually, we had been told several times we would have the
opportunity to visit our client. We were even told by Craig Kehoe, who is
the American there sort of supporting the prosecution, that the only reason
we couldn't meet our client was because he didn't have an Iraqi lawyer.
Five days before, I had received a letter from Pierre Prosper, the American
Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes, listing our client's Iraqi lawyers.
Something is wrong when they can't even get their own story straight.
Consequently after a single meeting in the presence of armed guards who
recorded everything we have not got another opportunity to meet our client.
In fact, we have been denied that opportunity repeatedly, and we have been
told that we will not get another opportunity to meet him. I think that is
unfortunate. I think, in fact, that is a crime, a war crime because, as you
know, to deny an individual a fair trial is a violation of the Geneva Conven-
tions, a grave breach.
A SSOCIA TE DEAN CHOD OSH:
Thank you, Mr. Doebbler. Another question for Mr. Scharf from the
audience: Isn't the exclusion of all Ba'athist judges analogous to having a
U.S. election or a jury selection process, but let's say no Democrats able to
vote or no Democrats able to serve on the jury?
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PROFESSOR SCHARF:
Well, ultimately what they excluded were the high level Ba'athist
judges and in particular those who had served in Saddam Hussein's security
courts, which were very similar to Adolph Hitler's courts, which were the
subject of the academy award winning movie "Judgment at Nuremberg,"
which most people have seen.
They did that because these judges were, in fact, tainted. They per-
verted justice and used the courts to commit crimes against humanity. Also
excluded were jurists who had been in exile abroad. I was very happy to
hear about that because I think those people had an axe to grind, and they
would not be capable of fairly judging.
The judges who were included are not just low-level traffic judges, as
the press has unfairly reported. These are judges that have many years of
experience with very complicated cases -- not necessarily war crimes or
genocide, but those cases are very rare, and no judges around the world
have experience with those until they are assigned to war crimes tribunals.
The IST judges are people that are neither too closely affiliated with Sad-
dam Hussein nor too much opposed to him. They have been carefully vet-
ted by the Iraq Bar Association, the Provisional Government, and the De-
partment of Justice. From my time spent training and socializing with them
in London, I can tell you that this is an incredibly bright, committed, and
courageous group of jurists.
ASSOCIATE DEAN CHODOSH:
Professor Doebbler?
PROFESSOR DOEBBLER:
Well, instead of looking at the reflection of an individual that is sitting
across from me with a Martini and trying to decide whether or not that indi-
vidual is an appropriate judge, I look at manifestations that are in the public
domain, and we know that the individual they chose to head this tribunal
initially was Salaam Chalabi, an individual who is on record saying that he
wants to kill the individual that he is going to be trying. Would you feel
that you are getting a fair trial if an individual who for a decade has been
trying to kill you is the one trying you?
ASSOCIATE DEAN CHODOSH:
I have one more question for Professor Doebbler: It has to do with the
question of the invasion of Iraq: You have argued that the underlying occu-
pation, the invasion of Iraq and the subsequent occupation, were illegal, that
that is a strong element in making the trial unfair. When is any invasion
illegal if there is a dictator violating his own people?
2005]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
PROFESSOR DOEBBLER:
I think an invasion is illegal when it is against a country's sovereignty,
its territorial integrity and its political independence. Read Article 2, sub-
paragraph 4 of the Charter of the United Nations, or if you want an interpre-
tation of that, read the Nicaragua case from around 1986.
There are a lot of bad leaders in the world. If you are going to use this
justification, that someone is a bad person so we need to invade their coun-
try, if we were to do that, even using that based on a consensus, in this in-
stance as I have indicated the invasion would have been the other way
around because as I said, before the invasion of Iraq, more people thought
George Bush was a greater threat to international peace and security than
they thought Saddam Hussein was, and we probably know that's true now
that they found no weapons of mass destruction, nothing that they could say
was a smoking gun in Iraq. We invaded a country because we didn't like
them.
We better hope that for our foreseeable future no other country is in
that same position and remembers our precedent and is able to invade us for
that same reason. And unfortunately, because of the political consequence
of what we did, there are a lot of countries that don't like us right now.
PROFESSOR SCHARF:
Let me just say that the difference between the 1999 NATO bombing
campaign against Serbia to stop the genocide in Kosovo and the 2003 inva-
sion of Iraq was that the emphasis in the latter case was on self-defense and
weapons of mass destruction rather than humanitarian intervention. I would
have been much more comfortable had the United States first pursued an
international indictment of Saddam Hussein, and then obtained international
approval for the invasion. I wrote as much in a Los Angeles Times Op Ed
titled "Indict Him, Don't Just Fight Him." But this does not mean that Sad-
dam Hussein should not now be brought to justice, that there should be im-
punity for the atrocities of his regime.
Let me take a moment to comment on the issue of Salaam Chalabi
because I think Mr. Doebbler just kind of threw up a strawman. As most
people know, Salaam Chalabi is no longer associated with the IST. Fur-
thermore, he was never a judge or a prosecutor. He was just the administra-
tor. His job was to do what a registrar does, and if a registrar says inflam-
matory things about the accused, I think they should be removed, but I don't
think that shows us that this international Iraqi Special Tribunal process is
somehow tainted. Thank you.
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ASSOCIATE DEAN CHODOSH:
I am going to give Professor Doebbler one more minute to conclude,
and I will allow Michael Scharf the last word since Professor Doebbler had
the first.
PROFESSOR DOEBBLER:
I just want to stress again that this is not a situation only for the people
of Iraq, although it is mainly for the people of Iraq. We killed thousands of
people in Iraq by our invasion of that country, and according to very reliable
estimates, hundreds of thousands of Iraqis -- these are conservative esti-
mates -- are going to die in the next five years because of this invasion.
That's more than died in that same period under Iraqi President Saddam
Hussein, even under sanctions.
For an American audience, I also think that what we are doing is cru-
cially important because we have contradicted our own basic values first by
invading the country contrary to international law and perhaps, even more
importantly, by now following that up with an unfair trial -- and I hope that
we will correct that quickly. Thank you.
PROFESSOR SCHARF:
Let me conclude by saying that after Nuremberg, there was hope that
"never again" would mean something, and it didn't. Unfortunately, during
the Cold War, we lived in an age of impunity where a person stood a better
chance of being tried and convicted for killing one person than for killing a
hundred thousand or a million.
Now, luckily we now live in a new age, the dawn of accountability.
We live in an age where there exist international tribunals and hybrid do-
mestic/international tribunals, and now the world's first internationalized
domestic tribunal, the IST, has been created.
And let me again stress that this internationalized tribunal is not just
getting assistance from the United States. There are many respected, inde-
pendent, non-governmental organizations around the world that are joining
this process. And I think experts in this field have to ask themselves: Do
they want to be like the UN Secretary General and stand on the side line and
hurl criticisms, or do they want to get involved to try to help the tribunal be
as fair as possible, so that in the words of Robert Jackson, the IST can "es-
tablish incredible events with credible evidence" and thereby facilitate rec-
onciliation and the rule of law in Iraq.
Having distinguished defense counsel like Mr. Doebbler is a very im-
portant ingredient; and so is enlisting international experts to help train the
IST judges. Having the Case Western Reserve University School of Law
help the judges by providing research memoranda on very difficult legal
questions will also be helpful. And despite the monumental challenges that
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such a case presents, I'm convinced that at the end of the day Saddam Hus-
sein will get his fair trial. Thank you.
